The LPCB LPS 1175 security standard explained

For the first in our series of blog articles, we will be explaining the LPCB LPS 1175 Standard in more detail. We also spoke to Richard Flint, Physical Security Technical & Business Development Manager at LPCB to understand where the standard is utilised.

What is LPS 1175?

LPCB’s Loss Prevention Standards (LPS) are now widely recognised and applied in fire and security sectors around the world. LPS 1175 is a standard focusing on the physical security of intruder resistant building components. LPS 1175 is one of 75 LPS standards controlled by LPCB covering various areas of security and fire resistance.

The standard sets the requirements, to test and then categorise intruder resistant building components, strong points, security enclosures and free-standing barriers. Products which can be put forward for testing and certification against the LPS 1175 standard include:

  • Access Covers
  • Barsets
  • Cabinets & Enclosures
  • Cladding
  • Gates
  • Shutters
  • Sliding Doors
  • Walls
  • Windows

When products are put forward for testing, their security resistance includes any hardware fitted to make up the finished product which includes locking systems, hinges and padlocks.

The test does not classify the components fitted to the product or certify them in their own right; these products will have to be individually tested against the relevant LPS standard. The method by which the product is installed is also assessed during the testing process, including the strength and resistance of the fixings used. The product must be installed into a suitable substrate, with resistance to attack, in line with the product itself.

How does the LPS 1175 Testing process work?

When submitting a product to LPCB for testing you decide on which security rating classification the product needs to meet. This security rating is made up of a letter and a number, the letter being the threat level relating to the toolkit used for the testing with the number relating to the delay time in minutes. Products tested with toolkit D for a time of 10 minutes, would be classified at D10 following a successful test regime.

The toolkits range from A all the way up to H, with the range of tools increasing from A to H. The tools available to the test attackers for each toolkit can be seen below:

  • Toolkit A
    • Adhesive tape (reel)
    • Cable cutter
    • Electric cable (Single core)
    • Engineers hooks (selection)
    • Firefighter’s key
    • Fishing line (e.g. polypropylene multi fibre)
    • Fishing hooks (selection)
    • Flexible plastic coupon
    • Glass cutter
    • Hexagon wrenches (selection)
    • Knife
    • Lever (including nail pullers, prybars and utility bars)
    • Pliers (selection, including self-gripping and cutting)
    • Punches (selection, including flat and pointed tipped)
    • Ratchet strap (selection)
    • Rope (selection, non-metallic)
    • Screwdriver
    • Scriber (selection)
    • Socket/Screwdriver set (selection)
    • Spanners (selection)
    • Traction screws
    • Tweezers (selection)
    • Universal key
    • Wire (selection)
    • WD40
    • Wood/plastic wedges (selection)

    The tools of this category are selected in order to simulate an opportunist attack by bodily physical force and using easily concealed tools.

  • Toolkit B

    Tool category A plus:

    • 3.6V Battery
    • Bolt cutter
    • Claw hammer
    • Drill bit (HSS / HSCO / Masonry)
    • Drill/driver
    • Electric cable (Single core)
    • Junior hacksaw
    • Junior hacksaw blades (HSS)
    • Metal plate shears
    • Multiple slip joint pliers
    • Pipe wrench
    • Pliers (selection, including self- gripping)
    • Screwdriver (7mm diameter, 250mm long)
    • Screwdriver (14mm diameter, 400mm long)
    • Socket set (selection)
    • 300mm Tube

    This tool category provides a more determined opportunist attack by bodily physical force and tools with a higher mechanical advantage.

  • Toolkit C

    Tool category A and B plus:

    • Axe
    • 12V Battery
    • Bolt cutter
    • Brick bolster
    • Cold chisel
    • Crowbar
    • Drill
    • Drill bit (HSS / HSCO / Masonry)
    • Fluorocarbon based freeze spray
    • Gas torch (Butane / Propane)
    • Hacksaw
    • Hacksaw blades (HSS / bimetal)
    • Hammer (3lb / 1.36 kg nominal head weight)
    • Pad saw
    • Pad saw blades (HSS / bimetal)
    • Scissor jack
    • Wood chisel

    The tool category is for deliberate forced entry of well-protected premises using bodily physical force and a wide selection of attack options.

  • Toolkit D

    Tool category A, B and C plus:

    • “A-tool” lock puller
    • 12V Battery
    • Bolt cutters
    • Drill bits (HSS / HSCO / Masonry / Tungsten Carbide)
    • Felling/fire axe (7 lb / 3.18 kg nominal head weight)
    • General purpose saw
    • Grinder
    • Grinder discs
    • Hole saw
    • Hooligan bar
    • Jigsaw
    • Jigsaw blades (HSS / HSCO /
    • Carbide)
    • “K-tool” lock remover
    • Plate shears
    • Sledgehammer (7 lb / 3.18 kg nominal head weight)
    • Steel wedges
    • 500mm Tube

    This tool category is for experienced attempts at forced entry.

  • Toolkit E

    Tool category A, B and C plus:

    • “A-tool” lock puller
    • 18V Battery
    • Bolt cutters
    • Circular saw
    • Circular saw blades
    • Drill (rotary and hammer action)
    • Drill bits (HSS / HSCO / Masonry / Tungsten Carbide)
    • Felling/fire axe (7 lb / 3.18 kg nominal head weight)
    • General purpose saw
    • Grinder (cordless)
    • Grinder discs
    • Hole saw
    • Hooligan bar
    • Jigsaw
    • Jigsaw blades (HSS / HSCO / Carbide)
    • “K-tool” lock remover
    • Plate shears
    • Reciprocating saw
    • Reciprocating saw blades (HSS / HSCO / Bimetal / Carbide)
    • Sledgehammer (7 lb / 3.18 kg nominal head weight)
    • Steel wedges (selection)
    • 500mm Tube

    This tool category is for experienced attempts at forced entry.

  • Toolkit F

    Tool category A, B, C and E plus:

    • 36V Battery
    • Chisel bits (SDS-Plus)
    • Circular saw
    • Circular saw blades
    • Disc grinder
    • Rotary, hammer action and/or SDS Drill
    • HSS / HSCO / Masonry Tungsten Carbide drill bits
    • SDS-Plus drill bit
    • Step drill / cone cutter drill bit
    • Tile / glass drill bit
    • Drill saw
    • “Glasmaster” saw
    • Grinder discs
    • Hole saw
    • Jigsaw
    • Maul – wood splitting (8 lb / 3.63 kg nominal head weight)
    • Pick axe (5 lb / 2.27 kg nominal head weight)
    • Pinch bar
    • Reciprocating saw
    • Reciprocating saw blades (HSS /
    • HSCO / Carbide)
    • Sledgehammer (10 lb / 4.54 kg nominal head weight)
    • Steel wedges
    • Tube
    • Wood boring spade bits (selection)

    This tool category provides a professional means of attempting forced entry into higher value storage areas generally after penetrating the façade.

  • Toolkit G

    Tool category A, B, C, E and F plus:

    • 54V Battery
    • Chisel bits (SDS-Plus)
    • Chainsaw (2-stroke)
    • 54W Circular saw
    • 54V Disc grinder
    • 54V Drill (rotary, hammer action and/or SDS-Plus)
    • Drill bits (HSS / HSCO / Masonry / Tungsten Carbide / SDS-Plus)
    • 450mm / 12kg Enforcer
    • Grinder (2-stroke)
    • Grinder discs
    • Hooligan bar
    • 54V Reciprocating saw
    • 4 Tonne Trolley jack
    • 150mm Tube

    This tool category is an enhancement of category E.

  • Toolkit H

    Tool category A, B, C, E, F and G plus:

    • Arcair (240V / 80 psi oxygen supply)
    • Arcair rods (selection)
    • Concrete chainsaw (2-stroke)
    • Grinder (2-stroke)
    • Grinder discs
    • Diamond core drill bit
    • Enforcer – 600mm long / 18 kg
    • 5 tonne hydraulic head and toe jack
    • Oxyacetylene cutting kit
    • Rescue chainsaw (2-stroke)
    • 5kW Ring saw (2-stroke)
    • Ring saw blades

    This tool category provides extreme means of attempting forced entry into higher value storage areas before resorting to the use of vehicles, firearms or explosives.

LPS 1175 Issue 8

With the release of the latest issue of the LPS 1175 standard, issue 8, came the option to allow the testing party to choose how long the product must delay the attacker. This is a drastic change to previous issues of the standard, whereby products were listed under an SR classification.

These ranged from SR1 through to SR8, with each having a toolkit and delay time associated with them. The table below details the new security classifications, from A1 to H20. You can also see the old ‘SR’ security classifications and where they now sit within the range. This new classification scheme provides security specifiers and customers with a larger range of options when choosing the security rating they require. Product specifiers are no longer restricted to a fixed toolkit and time and can now freely choose the toolkit and delay time required independently of each other.

The new ratings also allow specifiers to use a range of different products to achieve the required delay for an asset, using security products in a layered security method. This now means that 3 layers of security products can be used to secure an asset with ratings of C3, C3 and C5, providing a total delay time of 11 minutes with category C tools. Before the latest release of the LPS 1175 standard, each of these layers would have had to achieve 5 minutes delay time to be officially certified by LPCB.

For ease of specification, previous SR security ratings can still be achieved by testing to the following classifications.

SR1 – A1SR5 – E10
SR2 – B3SR6 – F10
SR3 – C5SR7 – G10
SR4 – D10SR8 – H20

Another addition to the standard is the introduction of an additional attacker, when you wish to test using category F, G or H tools. This update mimics a real-life attack where the likelihood of multiple attackers using this category of tools is very high.

We interviewed Richard Flint from LPCB to explain more about LPCB.

Richard Flint is the Physical Security Technical & Business Development Manager at LPCB. He is responsible for managing the certification schemes for physical security products and services and building hardware, developing new standards, schemes, and liaising with a wide selection of stakeholders to ensure LPCB’s standards and approval schemes deliver the security specifiers require and that the LPCB certification mark is the mark of effective security.

Firstly, in how many countries has the LPS 1175 standard been utilised?

The LPS 1175 standard has been utilised all over the world. The map below highlights several of the countries in which the standard has been specified. It is also referenced within some UN standards.


It is important to note that standards tend not to be adopted at national level other than if those standards are themselves published by their national standards body or they are international standards such as those published by ISO. That is not to say independent standards such as LPS 1175 are not adopted at a national level but it is more likely they are adopted by specific stakeholders.

Why choose LPS1175 over other security standards?

Stakeholders must choose the security standard which is most appropriate to the nature of the threat they wish to mitigate. When it comes to forced entry, they need to consider what that threat looks like because it can come in many forms. Different standards for forced entry protection exist to cover different types of forced entry threat.

What threats does LPS 1175 cover?

LPS 1175 addresses the threat of forced entry by those wishing to gain unauthorised access to a facility, asset or person without fear of generating noise during their access attempt. It addresses the threat of hostile actors using tools; not vehicles, not bombs nor firearms; in order to breach the protective measures. I will explain more about this later.

Stealth is a different type of forced entry threat; an example being the traditional household burglary in the UK. Those committing such crimes generally have a low expectation of the return (value of assets) they are likely to gain from committing a burglary and wouldn’t wish to be sent to prison for committing a crime unlikely to generate a reasonable financial return for their efforts. Such criminals can therefore tend to be risk averse, preferring to use small easily concealable tools in a manner that generate little or no noise in order to avoid drawing attention to themselves by being seen or heard.

Products certified to LPS 1175 would help to mitigate stealth attacks, simply because the standard addresses the threat of criminals more intent on achieving entry and willing to either make more noise or use larger less concealable tools in order to reach their objective. However, products certified to LPS 1175 may be more expensive compared with those engineered to prevent stealth style attacks. Alternative forced entry standards; such as LPS 2081 and PAS 24; were written around the stealth threat. They therefore potentially support the delivery of solutions offering more proportionate levels of resistance for use in environments where stealth type criminal activities are more likely to occur.

What about rioting or mob attacks?

Another type of forced entry threat stakeholders may face relates to what we term ‘mob attacks’, such as the rioting we recently witnessed in the USA. While products certified to LPS 1175 will go some way to delay entry to a protected facility in such circumstances, certainly more so than products meeting PAS 24, those products are not assessed to confirm their ability to resist the much greater loads a large group of people (mob) could potentially exert on them. An attack on a roller shutter door by 10 people in a riot situation will result in a far greater load being applied to the shutter curtain and the fixings which attach it to the front of a building than a single person could exert when testing it in accordance with the forced entry standards mentioned.

When considering a site’s protection, stakeholders should invest in delay measures – it is those measures (whether fences, gates, doors, windows, shutters, walls, safes, cabinets or other measures) that ‘buy’ you the time required to detect and respond effectively to a forced entry event. The resistance time achieved by the delay measures must exceed the time required to detect and respond if the security is to work effectively. If it doesn’t, that’s like leaving your front door open to a criminal and not being able to respond quickly enough because, by the time you have detected the incursion, they have already left with your prized possessions. Sadly, many front doors relied upon for forced entry protection offer little more than a few seconds of delay to those intent on achieving entry and willing to make noise – they offer little delay compared with an open door.

What other measures should those responsible for security consider, beyond those offering a physical delay?

As well as investing in suitable delay measures, it is also vitally important to detect the attempt as early as possible, such as at the perimeter fence line. If we again use the home as an example, PIR detectors will generally only trigger once a criminal has entered the space monitored by that detector. Such detectors are unlikely to point at the window because doing so is likely to generate too many false alarms. As a result, it is not likely to trigger until the window has been breached. By then, the principal delay measures protecting that space have been compromised resulting in a near zero net delay. Effectively, the time available in which to respond and apprehend the criminal is restricted to the time it would take them to grab the items they are after and leave the premises.

How do you think criminals perceive risk, and how can LPS 1175 be used to protect people and property from forced entry?

James Patterson once wrote: “You have to respect your enemy. Never, ever underestimate them. The second you do, they’ll squash you. Be smart about them. Respect their abilities, even if they don’t respect yours.” We must extend this approach to criminals and terrorists if we are to successfully defend ourselves, our property, loved ones and others from them. To that end, we recognise the fact many act in an entrepreneurial manner. Unless they are under the influence of alcohol/drugs, duress or are influenced by other factors which may cause them to act irrationally, they will almost certainly make an entrepreneurial judgement about whether they are going to commit a criminal act involving forced entry; whether burglary, terrorism or protest. Like a business entrepreneur, the investment they make to achieve their objective will be proportionate to the return they expect to realise as a result of committing that act. And, like any seasoned entrepreneur, they will also consider the risks they face and how they may influence their likelihood of success. So, let’s consider these three factors and how they may influence the decisions a criminal or terrorist may make when deciding what acts to commit.

Firstly, we need to look at their perception of return and how that influences their actions. The benefit they expect to gain from committing a burglary, for example, will almost certainly be related to their perception of the value of items they expect to acquire, whether to sell on or to use themselves. However, for a terrorist, the value will relate to their perception of the level and extent of the fear they can generate by committing the act and how much publicity they can achieve to maximise the spread of the fear they generate by committing the act.

The next consideration is the investment required to achieve that return; what tools they are likely to require to overcome the security measures in place, what reconnaissance and planning is required, the effort and stamina required to complete the attack and whether they require insider assistance in order to compromise the security measures in place.
The third consideration is risk. What risks will they face and how can they manage them? Could they be prevented from realising their objective and achieving the return they perceive possible? Can they adapt their approach in order to mitigate those risks to increase their likelihood of success? Those looking to achieve unauthorised entry by force will almost certainly consider factors such as their ability to approach the target without raising suspicion (for example, by selecting tools that are more easily concealed), the noise they may generate and whether it is likely to be heard/responded to. This is likely to influence the tools they select and how they use those tools.

LPS 1175 recognises all of these factors. It describes a range of tool levels (A to H) reflecting different levels of investment, and the different levels of risk faced while acquiring, transporting and using them. The tool categories defined in LPS 1175 range from small, common, relatively inexpensive tools at the lower categories through to far more specialist entry tools (e.g., the Hooligan bar in category D) or large and powerful tools (e.g., petrol driven grinders in categories G and H).

The final consideration is how long a hostile actor may be willing to spend overcoming the protective layer(s) they encounter. That largely relates to their perception of the effectiveness of the other sides of the site’s ‘security triangle’ – i.e., the effectiveness of the detection measures and the speed with which the first responders will arrive. LPS 1175 Issue 8 specifies a series of delays ranging from 1 minute through to 20 minutes, with other ratings reflecting 3-minute, 5-minute, 10-minute and 15-minute delays. The resulting classifications issued in accordance with LPS 1175: Issue 8, therefore provide a very firm indication of a barrier’s ability to delay intrusion. For example, a product achieving an E5 security rating has been demonstrated to be capable of stopping a wide array of attack methods utilising a wide range of hand tools as well as 18 V battery powered tools for at least 5 minutes.

The following infographic, produced by BRE, summarises the full suite of security ratings available within Issue 8:

Successful security not only relies on delay, detection and response measures working together when targeted, it also relies on giving hostile actors an impression that the risks involved and investment required outweigh their perceived value of the return. It is at that point criminals are deterred. LPS 1175 provides a security rating system which benchmarks the effectiveness of physical delay measures, whether perimeter barriers (e.g. fences, gates and turnstiles), façade elements (e.g. doors, windows, walling and roofing systems) or secondary and tertiary measures (e.g. shutters, grilles, cabinets and other enclosures). It and the supporting certification issued to it provide robust assurances of those barriers capability to deter, delay and deny unauthorised access while other ingredients within the security mix play their part detecting and responding.

If you are interested in finding out more about certified security solutions or need recommendations on how to branch out into the security market, we have over 10-years’ experience working in the security industry. Our team has a proven track record for designing and developing certified security products to meet the LPS1175 security requirements.

Contact us to discuss how we can help with your company’s needs.

"At the end of the day, the goals are simple: safety and security"

-- Jodi Rell

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